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Indeterminate # Immunity: A Review of the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
Angelica L. Revelant*
I.

Introduction

Jeffrey L. Fisher has recently "rocked the worlds of criminal
procedure and sentencing."' The 34-year-old Seattle associate got more
than he bargained for when he took Ralph Blakely's case on appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.2 Since Blakely v. Washington3 was
decided on June 24, 2004, the criminal justice system has been in
uncertain turmoil as state courts struggle to determine whether Blakely
applies to their sentencing guideline systems.4 Recently, in United States
v. Booker,5 the Supreme Court held that Blakely applied to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and rendered them unconstitutional.6 Given that
the Booker decision was rendered on January 12, 2005, 7 the effect of this
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.S./B.A. University of Pittsburgh, 2000. Sincere thanks to my
husband, Tim, for his endless love and support. The author would also like to thank her
mother, Joanne Kiggins, Erica Cline-Blackledge and Peter O'Mara for their
encouragement, and Jay A. Abom, Esquire, for the research assignment that spawned the
idea for this Comment.
1. Leonard Post, An Associate Rocks CriminalProcedure,27 NAT'L L.J. 16 (2004).
2. See id.
3. 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
4. See John Gibeaut, Future Factors: After Sentencing Rulings, Many States Are
Poised to Revamp Their Systems, 91 A.B.A. 14 (Mar. 2005). Prior to the United States v.
Booker decision, several Pennsylvania courts discussed Blakely's effect on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and reached different conclusions. See, e.g., United States v.
Jarrett, 334 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814-821 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (finding Blakely applied but did
not preclude imposition of guidelines sentence); United States v. Fotiades-Alexander, 331
F. Supp. 2d 350 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that Blakely applied but the sentence was
imposed properly); United States v. Harris, 325 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563-65 (W.D. Pa. 2004)
(finding Blakely applied and rendered guidelines unconstitutional as a whole); United
States v. Leach, 325 F. Supp. 2d 557, 558-62 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding Blakely applied
and rendered guidelines unconstitutional as applied).
5. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
6. See id. at 746.
7. Id. at 738.
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decision on state systems remains to be seen.
However, Blakely and Booker are not merely about sentencing
guidelines. Rather, they invoke clarification of the principles of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 The right to jury
trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 9 is fundamental to the system
of criminal procedure.' 0 Included in this right is the notion that the
prosecution must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt." However, some of the factors used to determine a
sentence are not elements of the offense, such as the whether a weapon
was involved 12 or the location of the crime.' 3 Prior to Blakely and
Booker, a judge could use these "enhancement" factors to increase a
sentence, even if the factors were not charged in the information and not
presented to a jury.' 4 Despite the rulings in Blakely and Booker that
these facts must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, 15
Pennsylvania courts have not complied, asserting that the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory.16 Thus, Pennsylvania judges are
still permitted to use enhancement factors not presented to a jury.
Regardless of whether the Guidelines are advisory, the provisions that

8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. Id.
10. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
guarantee was applied to the states); see also Respublica v. Doan, 1 U.S. 86 (1784) (the
Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in all civil cases); PA. CONST.
art. I, § 6 ("trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate");
PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("in all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury").
11. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
12. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(b) (1985) (relating to Deadly Weapon enhancement
sentence recommendations).
13. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9713 (1982) (when the crime occurs in or near
public transportation); 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(c) (1985) (relating to School Enhancement
sentence recommendations. If the court determines that an offender violated the drug act,
twelve (12) months shall be added to the lower limit of the standard range and thirtysix (36) months shall be added to the upper limit of the standard range.).
14. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (proof at sentencing for offenses
committed with firearms).
Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice
thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable
notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be
provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this
section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any
evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the
defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.
Id.
15. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
16. See infra Part IV.D.
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permit a judge to enhance a sentence using factors not proven to a jury
are unconstitutional.
This Comment focuses on the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
and the impact of the Blakely and Booker decisions on Pennsylvania's
criminal procedure jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the history of, and
the problems with, the Pennsylvania sentencing system. Part III
discusses the principal United States Supreme Court cases that ultimately
led to the Blakely decision. A discussion of the Blakely decision, as well
as a review of its effect in Pennsylvania, is provided in Part IV. Part V
discusses the Booker opinion. Finally, Part VI analyzes the future of the
Pennsylvania system in light of these Supreme Court decisions.
The Pennsylvania Sentencing System

II.
A.

A BriefHistory

Sentencing courts in Pennsylvania have generally harbored
"unfettered discretion in imposing sentences."' 7 Pennsylvania's criminal
statutes specify the elements, grade and degree of each particular state
crime.' 8 The General Assembly created a Sentencing Code 19 that
provides the maximum legal sentences for these offenses.20 For a
sentence of total confinement, the trial court must impose both a
maximum and minimum sentence. 2' The court has discretion to impose
a sentence anywhere within the statutory limits. Pennsylvania has an
indeterminate 22 sentencing system, which allows judicial discretion to
permit more individualized sentencing.2 3 Discretion is only limited in
that the sentence imposed must be within statutory limits and imposed
The
only after consideration of the sentencing guidelines. 24
Pennsylvania Sentencing Code25 requires that the court, in imposing a
sentence, "shall consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted by the

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620 n.2 (Pa. 2002).
See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18 (1998).
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9701 (1995) (relating to Sentencing Code provisions).
20. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (1996) (sentences of imprisonment for
felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1104 (1996) (sentences of imprisonment for
misdemeanor).
21. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. Am. § 9756(a)(b) (2000)
22. "Indeterminate," as it relates to sentencing, is defined as "the practice of not
imposing a definite term of confinement, but instead prescribing a range for the minimum
and maximum term." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (7th ed. 1999). "Determinate
sentencing," by contrast, fixes a defined period of time. Id. at 1367.
23. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 351 A.2d 650 (Pa. 1976).
24. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721 (1998) (relating to sentencing generally).
25. Id. § 9701.
17.
18.
19.
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Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. 26
The Commission on Sentencing was created in 1978 to establish
guidelines to be considered by courts when imposing sentences.27 The
General Assembly subsequently adopted the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines generated by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission.28
These Guidelines provide a standard range of minimum sentence, based
on the gravity of the offense charged and the defendant's prior record.29
The Guidelines also set forth aggravated and mitigated sentencing
ranges.3 °

31
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
discussed the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines in reviewing a
challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits. 32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the
Guidelines were implemented to address the problem of disparity in
sentencing and to restrict the discretion afforded sentencing judges. 33 It
acknowledged that a sentence might be excessive even if it is within the
statutory limits. 34 However, it also stated that the guidelines are not
mandatory, that "courts retain broad discretion in sentencing matters. 35
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has provided insight as well, stating
that "[a]lthough the sentencing guidelines specify definitive ranges of
minimum sentences, the adoption of the guidelines was not intended to
preclude judicial discretion. 3 6 The Superior Court reiterated this theme
in more recent cases, concluding that "the sentencing guidelines are
advisory only., 37 The problem in reconciling these statements with the

26. Id. § 9721(b).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1987).
28. 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.1-303.18 (1994).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 303.13.
31. 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002).
32. See id. at 620.
33. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Royer, 476 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(stating that the purpose of sentencing guidelines is to ensure that uniform sentences are
imposed); 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.11 (a) (relating to the purpose of sentence).
34. Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 623.
35. Id. at 620.
36. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 500 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
37. See, e.g., In re J.M.P., 863 A.2d 17, 19 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) ("We recognize
that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory and sentencing judges may sentence
outside of the guidelines if they deem it appropriate to do so and offer good reasons");
Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (guidelines are merely
advisory); Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 716 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)) (sentencing court
may sentence outside the guidelines so long as it offers reasons); Commonwealth v.
Pittman, 737 A.2d 272, 274 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (stating that the guidelines were not
mandatory and court was free to sentence to any statutorily-allowed term it deemed
appropriate).

2005]

INDETERMINATE : IMMUNITY

intended purpose of the guidelines is evident.
B.

The Problems: Are the Guidelines Mandatory?

Despite the general view that the Pennsylvania guidelines are
merely advisory,38 there are several indications that use of the guidelines
is more than suggested. First, trial judges are required to recite the
permissible range of sentences under the guidelines and to state on the
record clear reasons for departing from them when imposing a
sentence.39 The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v.
Johnson 40 stated that the judge may deviate from the guidelines after
considering "the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense... so long as he also
states of record the factual basis and specific reasons which compelled
him to deviate from the guideline range." 4 ' When the court imposes a
sentence outside the guidelines, the court "shall provide a
contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons for the
deviation from the guidelines. ' 42
A common "misconception" 3 is that the sentencing court is free to
impose any sentence within the limits allowed by law, so long as it states
its reasons on the record." However, the Superior Court recently
dispelled this belief, holding that sentencing courts must "faithfully
adhere" to the guidelines.45 This is a marked retreat from its previous
allusion that the guidelines are merely advisory.
These requirements seem averse to the long-standing view that the
guidelines are not mandatory. If the trial court's decision will be
overturned for failure to consider the guidelines,46 asserting that they are
advisory is illogical. If the judge is not bound by the guidelines, the
judge should not be required to state his reasons for departure from them.
The Sentencing Commission could hardly expect use of the guidelines to
reduce disparity in sentencing if it did not intend that the guidelines be

38. See id.
39. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (1998) (relating to sentencing generally); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Royer, 476 A.2d 453, 455-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("In every case
where a sentence is imposed, the court must state on the record at sentencing the reasons
for the imposition of sentence").
40. 666 A.2d 690 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
41. Id. at 693. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (1998) (relating to sentencing
generally).
42. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (1998).
43. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 156 (law requires "faithful" adherence to the guidelines).
46. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9781(c) (1980) (relating to appellate review of
sentence).
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followed as mandatory.4 7
The Superior Court recognized that a sentencing court is not free to
reject the guidelines and "interpose its own sense of just punishment." In
so doing, the intended goal in using the guidelines to promote
consistency "would be frustrated and we would be, de facto, in a
sentencing environment that existed prior to the passage of the
guidelines. '48 Thus, the sentencing court is not permitted to give only a
cursory glance at the guidelines.
If a judge is not free to impose a sentence within his discretion by
rejecting the guidelines, for fear of frustrating the purpose of the
guidelines, and retreating to a pre-guidelines system, the necessary
implication is that the guidelines are more than merely advisory. If the
prior system allowed unfettered discretion and the guidelines were
implemented to restrict discretion to promote uniformity, the only
manner of achieving this goal is for actual, mandatory utilization of the
guidelines.
Second, the Sentencing Code provides for appellate review of
sentencing. 49 Appellate review is discretionary with respect to all aspects
of sentencing except the legality of the sentence. 50 Appellate courts must
determine whether the sentence imposed is appropriate under the
Sentencing Code and whether the judge considered the guidelines as
required.5 1 A sentence is to be vacated if it is deemed unreasonable, or if
the guidelines were not considered at all in the imposition of sentence.5 2
The Superior Court admitted that, in spite of its previous assertions,
"appellate review of sentencing would become a mockery and a sham if
all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise of discretion of the
53
trial court.,
Evidence of the problems with the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines is illustrated in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.54
Although recently declared unconstitutional,55 the Federal Guidelines
56
were mandated by Congress to be binding on judges as a matter of law.
47. See State v. Jorgensen, 667 N.W.2d 318, 335 n.16 (Wis. 2003) (explaining that
use of the sentencing guidelines to reduce disparity in sentencing implies intent for
judges to follow the guidelines and impose sentences within guideline ranges).
48. Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 158-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
49. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9781(c) (1980) (relating to appellate review of sentence).
50. Id. § 9781(b).
51. Id. § 9781(c).
52. Id. § 9781.
53. Commonwealth v. Smart, 564 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (sentencing guidelines created by the Sentencing
Commission).
55. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment and are unconstitutional).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
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Under the Federal Guidelines, a judge was required to sentence within
the Guidelines as well as to provide reasons for the sentence imposed,
including reasons for departure from the Guidelines.5 7 The Federal
Guidelines were implemented to reduce sentencing disparity. 58 As the
Federal Guidelines and Pennsylvania Guidelines have similar purposes,
namely reducing disparity in sentencing, as well as similar requirements,
mandating consideration of the guidelines and reasons for departure from
them, the Pennsylvania guidelines are not advisory, but mandatory, and
quite possibly, unconstitutional.
Finally, methods of statutory construction reveal that the
Commission in its creation, and the General Assembly in its adoption, of
the Guidelines intended for them to be mandatory in nature. 59 Use of the
word "shall" in provisions of the Pennsylvania Code evidences
mandatory intent.6 0 Had the intention been for permissive use, or mere
consideration, the Commission would have used the word "may. 6 1
Additionally, the Guidelines include mandatory minimum provisions,62
in which the sentencing court does not have discretion in imposing a
sentence lower than the minimum sentences prescribed.6 3 It is an
anomaly to insist that a mandatory provision exists within a guidelines
scheme that is advisory.
Regardless of whether the sentencing guidelines are advisory,
Pennsylvania courts have missed the boat regarding the implications that
Blakely, 64 and now Booker,6 5 have on the Pennsylvania sentencing

57. Id. § 3553(c).
58. See id. § 3553 (sentencing guidelines are intended to reduce disparate
sentencing).
59. See 204 PA. CODE. § 303.1(a) ("The court shall consider the sentencing
guidelines in determining the appropriate sentence for offenders convicted of... felonies
and misdemeanors").
60. The word "shall" carries an imperative or mandatory meaning. See Oberneder v.
Link Computer Corp., 696 A.2d 148, 150 ("By definition, 'shall' is mandatory");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (7th ed. 1999) ("In common or ordinary parlance, and in
its ordinary signification, the term 'shall' is a word of command, and one which has
always or which must be given compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. The word in
ordinary usage means 'must' and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion").
61. See Jennison Family Ltd. P'ship v. Montour Sch. Dist., 802 A.2d 1257, 1262
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (remarking that in "other portions of the statute in question,
"shall" was used where no discretion clearly was meant to be vested, whereas "may" was
used to indicate that an action was permissive").
62. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a) (1982).
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 814 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) ("When mandatory minimum sentences are mandated by statute, the sentencing
courts discretion is restricted to compliance"); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a)
(1982).
64. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
65. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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66
system. 66
In order to clearly address how these decisions have
devastating effects, not only on how the courts interpret Blakely, but also
on the guidelines themselves, the discussion turns first to these
remarkable decisions.

III.

A Summary of Pre-Blakely Cases

There are five primary United States Supreme Court cases prior to
Blakely67 that discuss whether a judge may increase a sentence using
factors not presented to the jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.68
The same Justices spoke for the majority in each of these 5-4 decisions.69
The significance of the Blakely decision is partially due to a change in
the writers of the majority opinion. 70 Blakely was the second 71 instance
in which the minority in the Court's previous three decisions became the
majority.
The Court in In re Winship 72 held that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged., 73 However, Winship does not address when a
particular fact is to be considered an element, and this query is the
subject of an important discussion in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.74 The
Court in Winship reiterated that the right to jury trial is "basic in our law
and rightly one of the boasts of free society., 75 Justice Frankfurter stated
that "[t]he reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual error." 76 The stigma and loss of
liberty that come with a conviction warrant the high standard of proof in
criminal matters.77 The fact that a judge may increase a sentence by using
66. See infra Parts IV.D, VI.
67. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
68. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79
(1986); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
69. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas wrote for the majority of the first three cases discussed. Id. Justice
Scalia, Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg comprised the dissenting
opinions. Id.
70. Justice Thomas reversed course in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999),
joining the majority including Justice Souter, Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens and Justice
Ginsburg. Id.
71. The first instance was in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
72. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
73. Id. at 364.
74. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
75. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
76. Id. at 363-64.
77. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that "[t]he Due
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factors proven by a preponderance of the evidence 78 is in direct
contradiction of the reasonable doubt standard and the right to jury trial.
Permitting a reduced standard on factors used to further restrict one's
liberty interest is a violation of due process.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania79 is the United States Supreme Court's
first discussion of "sentencing factors," as distinguished from an element
of an offense. The McMillan case was a consolidated appeal of four
cases before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.80 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act 81 under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury trial guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment. 82
The Court in McMillan discussed
Pennsylvania's Sentencing Act, which provides that "a person convicted
of one of a number of enumerated felonies
is subject to a minimum
83
sentence of five years of incarceration.
The felonious conduct in each of the cases was visible possession of
a firearm. 84 Under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Act, visible possession
is not an element of the crime and the Commonwealth is therefore not
required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.85 The Act expressly
states that visible possession of a firearm is not an element but rather a
factor to be considered at the time of sentencing.8 6 The McMillan Court
found that the Act "operates solely to limit the sentencing court's
discretion in selecting a penalty. 87 In fact, if at sentencing the judge
finds evidence of visible possession of a firearm by a preponderance of
the evidence, the judge must order a sentence of at least five years.88 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed each trial court decision, holding
that the Act was consistent with due process guarantees.8 9 The90 Court
held that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing."
The dissent stated that the majority gave inappropriate deference to
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged").
78.

See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) ("The court ... shall determine, by a

preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable").
79.

477 U.S. 79 (1986).

80. See id. at 82.
81. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
82.
84.

See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a) (1982). See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id.
See id. at 85.
Id. at 88.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(c) (1982).
See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
Id. at 93.

83.
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the fact that the Pennsylvania legislature did not make the specific fact an
element of the crime. 91 Justice Stevens, dissenting, wrote that "if a State
provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give
rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that component
must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the
meaning of our holding in In re Winship.' 92
An important element of the Court's analysis was its indication that
the mandatory minimum statute did not permit increasing the penalty
beyond the statutory maximum. 93 Since the courts in Pennsylvania have
discretion to impose a sentence within the range permitted by statute, as
long as the sentence imposed does not go beyond the maximum in the
statute, it is permissible. However, what the courts had failed to
recognize thus far is that factors considered by a judge, and not proven to
a jury, could require a minimum sentence to be imposed, thereby
exposing the defendant to a greater punishment. As the Court in
Patterson v. New York 94 stated, the Due Process Clause requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in such circumstances, and those factors
should not be considered by the judge in sentencing alone. This dilemma
was corrected in the next case.
Jones v. United States95 is significant because it was the first of the
five prominent United States Supreme Court cases finding facts that may
increase a sentence to be elements rather than sentencing factors,
requiring submission of those facts to a jury. 96 In addition, the dissenters
in the four previous cases delivered the majority opinion in Jones,
gaining a majority through Justice Thomas. The Court held that although
"every fact with a bearing on sentencing" need not be found by a jury, 97
mandatory statutory provisions establishing higher penalties are elements
of the offense, not sentencing considerations.9 8 The Court held that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments require these elements to be charged in the
indictment, submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 99 This case turned the tables for the United States Supreme Court
and began a closer analysis of the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.

91. See id. at 93-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 88.
94. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (clarifying that the Due
Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct which exposes a
criminal defendant to greater stigma or punishment).
95. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
96. See id.
97. Id. at 248. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
(recidivism need not be proven at trial for fear of unfair prejudice to the defendant).
98. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
99. Id. at 243 n.6.
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Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 00 a landmark case regarding sentencing,
established the rule that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."' ' l The Court in Apprendi held that the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated when the judge imposed a sentence greater than the
maximum allowed under state law.10 2 This is important, as the Apprendi
rule has been cited as prohibiting only those sentences that exceed the
statutory maximum. ° 3 The rule, however, does not prevent judges from
imposing a sentence within statutory limits or from increasing a
minimum sentence based on facts not proven to a jury beyond reasonable
doubt.1 0 4 The Apprendi rule has come under attack, as it was unclear
whether the Court meant05to limit its application only to facts that increase
the maximum sentence.'
10 6
The confusion was not eliminated in Harris v. United States,
where the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence.' 0 7 The Court stated that the
"judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence
within the range without seeking further authorization from those juries
without contradicting Apprendi."'0 8 However, it was disputed whether
there is a difference between facts that enhance the maximum sentence
and those that enhance a minimum sentence.' 0 9 The answer to this
100. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
101. Id.at 490.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roney, No.354-CAP, 2005 WL 106771 (Pa. Jan. 20,
2005) (stating that the death penalty does not constitute a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum for purposes of Apprendi); Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (stating that the Apprendi rule was not implicated when defendant was
sentenced within the aggravated range, but below the statutory maximum);
Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that Apprendi
was inapplicable since the court did not impose a sentence in excess of the statutory
maximum); Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding
Apprendi did not apply because the sentence fell within statutory range); Commonwealth
v. Chambers, 852 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (Apprendi and Jones are of no
applicability when the case involved a sentence enhancement that does not enhance the
sentence beyond the statutory maximum).
104. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
105. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Booker, No.04-104, 2005 WL 50108 (S.Ct. Jan. 12, 2005).
106. 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002).
107. See id. at 2411.
108. Id. at 2415.
109. Compare Harris, 536 U.S. at 579-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("there are no
logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums any differently than
facts that increase the statutory maximum") with Harris,536 U.S. at 569-79 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[t]he Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factorswhether those factors lead to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi)
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dispute is found in Blakely v. Washington"
Booker. "II

and United States v.

IV.

Blakely v. Washington

A. FactualBackground and ProceduralHistory
Ralph Blakely, Jr. pled guilty in the Washington Superior Court to
second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a
firearm." 2 The statutory maximum for this class B felony is ten
years. 11 3 The facts in the plea supported a sentence in the standard
range of forty-nine to fifty-three months. 1' 4 The judge imposed a
sentence of ninety months," 5 finding the defendant acted with deliberate
cruelty, a statutorily enumerated ground for departing from the standard
range.' 16
The defendant appealed his sentence to the Washington State Court
of Appeals. 17 He alleged that the sentencing procedure deprived him of
his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a
reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. 18
B.

The Supreme Court's Holding

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a sentence imposed, which is less than the statutory maximum,
but greater than the standard range for the offense, violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when the trial judge
increased the sentence based on facts not submitted to the jury. 19 The
Supreme Court decided in favor of the defendant, holding that the
sentence was illegal.' 20 The Court held that factors that increase a
defendant's sentence within or beyond the2 1 maximum range of sentencing
guidelines must be presented to the jury.'

or the application of a mandatory minimum (as here)").
110. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). See discussion infra Part IV.
111. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). See discussion infra Part V.
112. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
113. Id. at 2535.
at 2534.
114. See id.
at 2535.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. App. Ct. 2002) (affirmed).
118. State v. Blakely, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003) (review denied).
119. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 429 (2003) (cert. granted).
120. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) (All further citations to Blakely
will reference this decision.).
121. Id.
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As a result of Blakely, judges no longer have the discretion to
increase a defendant's sentence based on mandatory enhancement factors
if those facts have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt., 22 The
Blakely Court found the Washington Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional as applied but reserved the question
of whether the
1 23
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional.
C. Analysis of the Court'sReasoning
The majority in Blakely applied the Apprendi rule, 124 which states
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.', 125 The
Court clarified that the "statutory maximum" is the "maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.', 126 It further held that the

Constitution limits the States' authority to reclassify elements
as
127
sentencing factors, but did not make clear where that line is drawn.
The defendant in Blakely received a sentence greater than the
standard range maximum because the judge found the defendant acted
with deliberate cruelty, a fact neither submitted to a jury nor admitted by
the defendant. 128 The maximum sentence for a class B felony,
specifically second degree kidnapping, is ten years. 129 However, the
facts in Blakely supported only a fifty-three-month sentence, the standard
sentence plus factors justifying an exceptional sentence. 130 These other
factors, stipulated to by the defendant in the guilty plea, included
elements relating to a firearm allegation requiring a thirty-six-month
enhancement over the standard sentence.131 Had they not been included
in the guilty plea, the judge would not have had justification to go
beyond the standard sentence of thirteen to seventeen months. 132 The

122. Id.
123. Id. at 2538 n.9. See infra Part V.
124. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
125. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 2537 n.6. The Court distinguished McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986), and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), as neither case
involved a sentence greater than what state law authorized on the basis of the verdict
alone.
128. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
129. Id. at 2535 (discussing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.40.030(3),
9A.20.02 1(1)(b) (2000)).
130. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
131. Id.
132. Id. at2538.
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judge therefore exceeded his authority by imposing a sentence well
beyond the fifty-three months permitted.
Justice O'Connor dissented and discussed the effect that the
majority's decision will have on sentencing guidelines and the judicial
system in general. 133 In arguing against the results reached in Apprendi
and Blakely, she stated that deference to legislative labels "would be
easier to administer.., as courts would not be forced to look behind
statutes and regulations to determine whether a particular fact does ' or
34
does not increase the penalty to which a defendant was exposed."'
However, she further stated that ease of administration is not necessarily
the goal, because it is the duty of the courts to decipher and interpret
statutes and regulations that it finds ambiguous.' 35 Rather than
considering the number of defendants that are currently incarcerated
possibly longer than what is constitutionally permissible, Justice
O'Connor focused on the sentences imposed under the guidelines. 36 She
expressed the view that these sentences are all in jeopardy and ignored
the fact that many defendants' liberty rights may have already been
sacrificed.

137

However, Justice O'Connor misread the impact of the majority
opinion. She discussed substantial costs such as "separate, full-blown
jury trials during the penalty phase proceeding."' 138 She described
circumstances where the facts relevant to sentencing are not known prior
to trial. 139 This scenario, albeit possible, shows that the state waits to
meet its burden until after the defendant is convicted. Despite not
knowing certain facts or details until trial, the state is still required to
meet its burden of proving every element of the offense charged.
Justice Breyer disagreed only with the majority's conclusion.' 40 He
agreed that the distinction between sentencing factors and elements of an
offense turns only on the label given by the legislature. 141 He departed
from the majority by stating that the two concepts do not require the
same treatment under the Sixth Amendment. 142 Justice Breyer then
described three options for sentencing. 143 First, determinative sentencing
133. See id. at 2543-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote that
"today's decision casts constitutional doubt over them all" referencing states that have
enacted guidelines systems, including Pennsylvania. Id. at 2549.
134. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2549.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2546.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 2552. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
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requires the same sentence for all offenders of the same crime, despite
differences in the circumstances of the crime or the offender's criminal
history.144 Justice Breyer is correct in that this type of sentencing scheme
would create over-uniformity, treating all cases identically and not
allowing departures for actual differences in circumstances surrounding
the crime. It further permits prosecutors to manipulate the sentence
desired through choice of charge.145 However, prosecutorial discretion is
a feature of the United States criminal justice system. Blakely does not
implicate any change in the discretion given to a prosecutor.
The second option described by Justice Breyer, indeterminate
sentencing, allows too much discretion, permitting the abuses, unfairness
and lack of uniformity that the sentencing guidelines intended to
abolish. 146 This is the hallmark of the Pennsylvania system.
The final option is what the Apprendi rule intended. This option
allows judges to decrease a sentence based on mitigating factors, but
only allows increases of sentences based on aggravating factors if these
factors were proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 47 Justice
Breyer exaggerated the viability of this option. He claimed that the
legislature would have to revamp crimes codes to subdivide each crime
to allow common
sentencing factors to be included in each statutorily
48
1
crime.
defined
However, Justice Breyer's assertion is misguided. As stated above,
the prosecutor would merely have the burden of proof to show that these
sentencing factors were relevant to the case at hand. It would require
only additional evidence and proof on the part of the prosecution. This
would not necessitate a restructuring of crimes codes. Instead of
allowing the prosecution to give notice of intent to use an enhancement
factor after conviction and prior to sentencing, 149 a requirement that it be
in the information and proved beyond a reasonable doubt would satisfy
Blakely's requirements. The Court in Jones150 implemented this type of
procedural requirement.
Justice Breyer incorrectly stated that defendants are put into the
position of contesting material aggravating facts in the guilt phase of

144. Id. at 2552-53.
145. Id. at 2553.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2554.
148. Id. at 2554-55.
149. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (stating that "notice to the defendant
shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's
intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before
sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing").
150. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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their trials. 15'The prosecution has the burden to show every element and
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is not on the defendant to
show the negative. Justice Breyer's argument results in an improper
burden-shifting, which due process itself sought to prevent.
Although Justice Breyer's concerns are legitimate, defendants are
often put in the position of offering alternative defenses. However, one
way to eliminate this potential for prejudice is to bifurcate the trial to
have the jury hear additional evidence for enhancements after conviction
for sentencing purposes. This would be no different than how trials and
sentencing are bifurcated on whether to impose the death penalty.
Another possibility is special verdict forms presented to the jury to
determine whether any additional factors apply. As there are means to
cope with the consequences of the Blakely decision, the focus should be
on implementing these means to ensure that the constitutional guarantees
of all persons are protected.
D. Pennsylvania Cases-BlanketDismissal of Blakely
Despite the common assertion that the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines are merely advisory, the Pennsylvania system is not immune
to analysis or precluded from significant reconsideration in light of
Blakely and Booker. However, a review of Pennsylvania case law yields
many arguments based on Blakely that were summarily dismissed as
inapplicable due to the advisory nature of the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines. 152 Some courts have stated that Blakely will not affect the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines since they are considered
advisory. 53 These decisions have muddied the waters, as many courts
are unsure how to or whether to apply Blakely.
Following the Blakely decision, the Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Brice154 upheld a sentence in which a mandatory
minimum was applied. A notation after the concurring opinion stated
that "it would seem that a jury would be required to make this
determination in future cases using the beyond a reasonable doubt

151. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555.
152. See Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (stating that
Blakely does not implicate the Pennsylvania indeterminate scheme, where there is no
promise of a specific sentence); Commonwealth v. Rosetti, No.417-MDA-2004, 2004
WL 2808753 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2004) (finding that Blakely does not apply because
the facts authorized the statutory maximum sentence without reference to other facts not
found by jury); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 67 Pa. D.&C.4th 458 (Pa. Corn. P1. 2004)
(stating that Blakely does not apply to an indeterminate sentencing system).
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibson, 716 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998);
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
154. 856 A.2d 107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
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standard.' 55 The insight in that remark seems to have fallen by the way
side, as the Superior Court has yet to hold that Blakely applies in
Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 6 the Superior Court again
stated that Blakely is not applicable because the Pennsylvania sentencing
system is indeterminate.157 However, it clarified that Blakely may be
implicated "to the extent that an enhanced minimum term leads to a
longer period of incarceration by 5 8extending the date at which the
defendant is eligible to be released."'
Though several decisions15 9 reflect that the Sixth Amendment is
not violated so long as the sentence is not beyond the statutory
maximum, the courts are not reading clearly the problems in Blakely.
Though the United States Supreme Court in Blakely makes confusing
references to the "statutory maximum," the sentence imposed was greater
than the guidelines standardrange maximum, not the statutory maximum
for that crime.
Until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hears and decides this issue,
the courts will continue to generate vastly different interpretations of
Blakely's effect on the Pennsylvania Guidelines. 160 The United States
Supreme Court's recent decision may shed light 61
on the fact that review
of the Pennsylvania Guidelines is now necessary.'
V.

United States v. Booker

One of the questions left open by Blakely was the effect, if any,
Blakely had on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 62 Due to the lack of
a conclusive statement regarding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
courts applied Blakely to both state163and federal guidelines systems,
resulting in vastly different outcomes.
155. Id. at 114 n.7 (Bender, J.,
concurring).
156. Commonwealth v. Smith, No.1016-EDA-2004, 2004 WL 2803331 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Dec. 7, 2004).
157. Smith, 2004 WL 2803331, at *5.

158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Brice, 856 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. 2004); Commonwealth v. Bromley,
862 A.2d 598 (Pa. Super. 2004).
160. See Commonwealth v. Schaffer, No.2128-WDA-2002, 2005 WL 54725, at *10
n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (the Pennsylvania Superior Court has granted en banc
review in Commonwealth v. Kleinicke, No. 986 MDA 2003, to determine the effect of
Blakely on sentencing in Pennsylvania).
161. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). See infra Part V.
162. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004) (stating that the
Federal Sentencing guidelines were not before the Court).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Pineiro, 2004 WL 1543170 (5th Cir. Jul. 12, 2004)
(holding that the guidelines are constitutional); United States v. Montgomery, 2004 WL
1562904 (6th Cir. Jul. 14, 2004) (holding that the guidelines are unconstitutional); United
States v.Ameline, 2004 WL 30326 (9th Cir. Jul. 21, 2004) (stating the guidelines are
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As noted above, the majority expressly stated that it reserved any
question regarding the Federal Guidelines.1 64 The answer to the question
concerning the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
was provided in United States v. Booker on January 12, 2005.165 It only
took three months for that important question to be presented to the
Court, as it heard argument on United States v. Booker'6 6 and United
States v. Fanfan167 on October 4, 2004. Though the cases were
consolidated on certiorari before the Supreme Court, this section limits
the discussion to the results in Booker. The court in Fanfan, relying on
Blakely, refused to impose a sentence based on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and instead imposed a sentence based on the guilty verdict
68
alone. 1
The Court retained the guidelines as advisory by striking two
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act that made the guidelines
mandatory. 169 The Booker Court began its analysis with a review of
decisions interpreting sentencing procedures similar to that provided in
this Comment. 70 Though the Government advanced several arguments
attempting to distinguish Blakely's ruling about the Washington
guidelines from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court was not
convinced.17 1 An important part of the discussion involves the Court's
review of the Apprendi rule. The Court clarified that "we were only
considering a statute in that case... [i]t was therefore appropriate to
state the rule in that case in terms of a 'statutory maximum' rather than
answering a question not properly before us.' 72
This distinction is incredibly important for the Pennsylvania line of
decisions that rejected Apprendi on the basis that the rule was limited to
sentences that exceed the statutory maximum. However, the Court now
makes clear that it used the language it did in stating the rule because that
pertained to the matter before it. The Court has expressly stated that it
did not intend for the rule in Apprendi to be so narrow. 173 A further
statement verifies that neither Apprendi nor Blakely are limited to
sentences that increase the maximum. "Applying Blakely to the
unconstitutional and severable).
164. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.
165. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
166. Id.
167. United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
168. Id.
169. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (courts "shall" impose a sentence within the
guideline range).
170. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748. See discussion supra Part III.
171. Seeid.at752.
172. See id. at 752-53.
173. See id. ("More important than the language used in our holding in Apprendi are
the principles we sought to vindicate").
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Guidelines would invalidate a sentence that relied on such an
enhancement if the resulting sentence was outside the range authorized
174
by the jury verdict."'
The United States Supreme Court restated its proposition that the
analysis is not concerned with what the legislature defines as elements of
a crime, but rather "the constitutional safeguards" and "required
procedures for finding the facts that determine the maximum permissible
punishment., 175 It reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi, stating that "[a]ny
fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by
a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or
176
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Though the Court again uses "maximum," it surely means the most
a judge can sentence authorized by the facts proven beyond a reasonable
doubt or admitted by the defendant alone. This is evident from later
discussions in the opinion which dictate that "judicial factfinding to
support an offense level determination or an enhancement is only
unconstitutional when that finding raises the sentence beyond the
sentence that could have lawfully been imposed
by reference to facts
177
found by the jury or admitted by the defendant."'
The Booker Court also discussed the consequences of declaring the
guidelines unconstitutional. It found that "[i]n many cases, prosecutors
could avoid an Apprendi problem simply by alleging in the indictment
the facts necessary to reach the chosen Guidelines sentence.' 78
VI. Conclusion: What the Future Holds for Pennsylvania
The Superior Court in Smith 179 reminds us that the United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. United States' 80 determined that "the
Pennsylvania indeterminate system does not violate the Sixth
Amendment so long as the enhanced minimum sentence is not beyond
that authorized by the jury verdict."' 8' The Court in Booker restates the
Apprendi rule to allow more forgiving procedures and more protection of
174. Id. at 753.
175. Id. at 755.
176. Id. at 756.
177. Id. at 775.
178. Id. The Court further stated that a requirement of jury factfmding for certain
issues can be implemented without difficulty in the vast majority of cases. In fact,
according to the Court, the Department of Justice had already instituted procedures to
protect future cases "from Blakely infirmity." Id. at 779.
179. Commonwealth v. Smith, No.1016-EDA-2004, 2004 WL 2803331, at *5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2004).
180. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
181. Id.
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the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
Allowing the jury to find only those facts that the legislature
considers elements and then permitting the judge to sentence based on
any other fact would produce an arbitrary system, which is a result the
Sentencing Guidelines intended to prevent. The Court in Booker made
clear that a judge is not permitted to increase a sentence by relying on
facts not presented to the jury or admitted by the defendant. It made
clear that a judge may not impose any sentence other than what the jury
verdict or defendant's stipulations allow.
Pennsylvania must make considerable changes to the current
sentencing system for compliance with Blakely and Booker. Nearly all
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines provide that certain
enhancements are not elements and need only be found by the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence.182 Some provisions even provide for an
increase in the upper limit or the maximum sentencing range.1 83 These
provisions cannot withstand even the Apprendi rule, in that they permit a
judge to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
Further, not every defendant opts for a jury trial. Many defendants
do not have a jury trial, by virtue of plea agreements or otherwise. If the
dissenters in Blakely believe that the result is simplified by allowing
juries to decide elements and judges to decide sentencing factors, what
happens when the defendant pleads and foregoes his right to trial by
jury? The plea agreement must include the sentencing factors so the
defendant is truly apprised of the ranges of sentencing that may be
imposed. Can the defendant truly understand what he is pleading to,
what he has given up when he pleads guilty? Is he agreeing that he may
receive a particular sentence, only to be "surprised" by the imposition of
an enhancement by the prosecution or judge in considering factors to
which the defendant did not agree, admit or stipulate?
The inherent unfairness of this system seems to be what the
Guidelines were intending to avoid. The necessary step is not to forego
the sentencing guidelines by declaring them unconstitutional, but rather
to advance their importance by considering the relevance of sentencing
enhancements and other factors during the trial and plea bargaining
stage. If the defendant is apprised, at the time of trial or prior thereto,
that he is subject to an enhanced sentence because a firearm is involved,
he may better ascertain the options of foregoing trial and pleading or
continuing with trial. In fact, requiring the prosecution to state these

182. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9701 (Proof at Sentencing provision).
183. See, e.g., 204 PA. CODE § 303.13 (1994) (Guideline sentence recommendations:
aggravated and mitigated circumstances) (may impose a sentence that is up to nine
months longer than the upper limit of the standard range).
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items in the information might afford better protection to the defendant.
Regardless of the option the defendant chooses, the prosecution is not
relieved of their burden of proof of what actually took place in the
circumstances of the crime.
One concern is a substantial increase in the number of prisoner
petitions under the Post Conviction Relief Act that would cite Blakely
and ailege an illegal sentence. Many defendants have been petitioning
for post-collateral relief and citing Blakely in the hopes that a decision
will be rendered in their favor, with a finding Blakely does, in fact, apply
to the Pennsylvania Guidelines. Though the United States Supreme
Court did not make the decisions in Blakely or Booker have retroactive
effect, it is still difficult to determine the number of cases that are
affected by the Blakely decision. We have yet to determine its potential
impact on the individual state sentencing guidelines. But the Court in
Booker recognizes:
In some cases jury factfinding may impair the most expedient and
efficient sentencing of defendants. But the interest in fairness and
reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law right
that defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the
Sixth Amendment-has
always outweighed the interest in concluding
184
trials swiftly.

184.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738.

